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T IT L E  BY POSSESSION
B y  C h a s .  S. M a g o w a n ,  C. E .,
(C lass o f  1884).
The subject of this article, although essentially one of law, 
possesses more than a passing interest to the surveyor, includ­
ing, as it does, questions which he must often discuss with his 
clients. In substantiation of this assertion the valuable paper 
by Chief Justice Cooley, of the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
on the Judicial Functions of the Surveyor, may be quoted, in 
which, in speaking of the difficulties experienced in re-locating 
and re-establishing lost landmarks, it is said: “He, the surveyor, 
hasno right to mislead, and he may rightfully express his opinion 
that an original monument was at one place, when at the same 
time he is satisfied that acquiescence has fixed the right of 
parties as if it were at another, * * * the farthest he has a
right to go as an officer of the law is to express his opinion 
where the the monument should be, at the same time that he 
imparts the information to those who employ him, and who 
might otherwise be misled, that the same authority that makes 
him an officer and entrusts him to make surveys, also allows 
parties to settle their own boundary lines, and considers acqui? 
esence in a particular line or monument for .any considerable 
period as strong, if not conclusive evidence of such settlement.” 
Justice Cooley further says: “The surveyor must inquire into 
all the facts, giving due prominence to the acts of parties
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concerned, and always keeping in mind, first, that neither his 
opinion nor his survey can be conclusive upon the parties con­
cerned, and second, that courts and juries may be required to 
follow after the surveyor, over the same ground, and that it is 
exceedingly desirable that he govern his action by the same 
lights and same rules that will govern theirs.” Accordingly 
it is necessary, or at least highly desirable, that the surveyor 
should interest himself in those rules which do govern courts 
and juries in their possible review of his decisions, and his 
resulting field work as a surveyor.
It is needless to say that in the preparation of this paper 
the major portion of the work has been the gathering of “ posies 
from other men’s flowers,” and if, perchance, the resulting 
bouquet may bring enjoyment to some, or to others instruction, 
the writer will feel amply repaid for his efforts.1
Before attempting to discuss Title by Possession, it will be 
well to note what constitutes title.
According to Blackstone there are three gradations of 
title, “ namely: First, mere possession without right; secondly,
the right of possession, which may be enforced by action; 
thirdly, the absolute, right of property without possession or 
the present right of possession; and a perfect title consists in 
the union of these three gradations. But such refinements 
serve rather to perplex, than inform the mind. The truth is 
that title means the same thing as ownership. A man may be 
in possession of a thing which he does not own; and he may 
own a thing of which he is not in possession. Possession, 
therefore, though it creates a presumption of ownership, and 
though it may ripen in time into actual ownership, is not of 
itself ownership. He who is in possession without right is liable 
to be dispossessed by him who has the right—and he who has the 
right without possession may acquire possession by recourse 
to  the law. One of the elementary principles in the action of i
i  T h i s  p a p e r  w a s  f i r s t  w r i t t e n  t o  b e  r e a d  b e f o r e  t h e  B a c o n i a n  C l u b  
o f  t h e  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I o w a .  T h e  w r i t i n g -  o f  i t  w a s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  
o n e  o n  t h e  s a m e  s u b j e c t  b y  J u d g e  H o o k e r ,  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  
M i c h i g a n ,  r e a d  b e f o r e  t h e  M i c h i g a n  E n g i n e e r i n g  S o c i e t y  i n  1 8 9 5 ,  f r o m  
w h i c h  p a p e r  I  h a v e  q u o t e d  f r e e l y .  I  a l s o  w i s h  t o  a c k n o w l e d g e  m y  
. o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  J u d g e  S a m u e l  H a y e s ,  P r o f e s s o r  o f  L a w  i n  t h e  S t a t e  U n i ­
v e r s i t y  o f  I o w a ,  f o r  v a l u a b l e  s u g g e s t i o n s ,  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  h i m ,  r e g a r d ­
i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  p a p e r .  T h e  A u t h o r .
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ejectment is that the plaintiff must rely solely upon the 
strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of the 
defendant’s title.” See McCarty v Rochel, 85 la., 427. “The 
reason is that actual possession is prima facie evidence of title, 
and gives the occupant a right against every person who can 
not show, not simply a better, but a good title. If^ however, 
the person in possession be a mere intruder, he is not permitted 
to question the validity of the plaintiff’s title, unless the latter 
were a mere intruder; for any shadow o f right in the plaintiff 
will be sufficient against the mere possession without a right. 
The first step, then, is for the plaintiff to exhibit a sufficient 
title; and until he does this, the defendant may rely simply on 
his possession without further proof. But when this is done 
the defendant must meet it by showing a better title, either in 
himself or some third person. It would seem, therefore, that 
the perfection of title consists in the union of possession with 
the right of possession; for where these meet in the same 
person he can not be rightfully dispossessed. In other words he 
is the lawful present ow?ier oi the property; and this is the whole 
of the matter. The question, then, is what constitutes legal 
ownership of property? and this is answered by describing the 
ways in which ownership may be acquired, and what is evidence 
of such acquisition. * * * * *
* * * There are five ways of acquiring title to
property; namely: by occupancy, by marriage, by descent, by 
devise, and by purchase.” (Walker’s Am. Law, p. 356-7). In 
this paper the writer purposes dealing only with that method of 
acquisition known as occupancy, and only with realty acquired 
by occupancy, which is often treated of under the head of pre­
scription.
“Where property of any description is without an owner it 
fairly belongs to the first person who takes possession. This 
is a dictate of the law of nature; and if ever there was a time 
when there was no such thing as exclusive individual property, 
occupancy may have given the first title. This, too, is the 
foundation of title by discovery. Consequently the whole 
American continent was parceled out among the various Euro­
pean nations according to the priority of discovery; the 
occupancy of the Aborigines not having been regarded as
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sufficient to prevent the acquisition of title by discovery. At 
present, however, so small is the amount of property which 
has not a legal owner, that the right of acquiring property by 
occupancy is of less importance than formerly; still there are 
some cases in which this right is called into exercise. It is 
settled that if soil be formed from the sea or river, by gradual 
alluvion, it is the property of the adjacent owner. If an island 
be formed in an unnavigable river it belongs to the owner of 
the nearer bank; or if the middle line of the river passes 
through it, the portions on each side of the line belong to the 
respective owners of the adjacent banks. Again with regard 
to the use of air, water and light, as connected with the owner­
ship of land, great weight is always given * * * to prior 
occupancy. The doctrine is that he who has made the first 
appropriation of either of these elements to a particular use is 
entitled to protection in the enjoyment of that use; but this 
doctrine is modified by so many considerations growing out of 
the increase of population and public policy, that it is difficult 
to lay down any precise rules on the subject. In the above cases 
the ownership is supposed to be vacant, and the right of appro­
priation originates in the law of nature. But we have two 
important statutes, the effect of which is to enable persons to 
acquire title by occupancy when the ownership was not vacant 
when the possession was taken. These are the statute of limi­
tations, and the statute of occupying claimants.”
“The statute of occupying claimants is intended to benefit 
those persons only who have taken possession of land, sup­
posing they had an undoubted title, and in this confidence 
have made valuable improvements, which, by the common law, 
they would utterly lose on being evicted by a superior title.” 
“ The act enumerates five classes of occupants whom it pro­
tects; namely: first, those who can show a plain and connected 
title either in law or equity, derived from the records of some 
public office; secondly, those who claim by descent, devise, deed,, 
or title bond under the foregoing; thirdly, those who claim 
under a sale, or execution against either of the foregoing; 
fourthly, those who claim under a regular tax sale; fifthly, those 
who claim under a sale by executors, administrators, guardian 
or other persons, by order of court.”
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“If a person of either of these descriptions has occupied land 
without fraud or collusion, he cannot be evicted by any claimant 
having a superior title, until he has been fully paid for all last­
ing and valuable improvements made previous to the com­
mencement of the suit, unless he refuse to pay the claimant 
the value of the land without improvements. The act proceeds 
upon the plain, equitable ground, that the improvements hon­
estly made, ought in fairness, to belong to the occupant, and 
the land itself to the claimant. But as they cannot be separ­
ated the one must take both, the party taking both must pay 
the other the fair value of his share.” (Walker’s Am. Law, 
p. 360.) It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the 
mode of ascertaining the respective claims of the two parties. 
Attention is simply called to this statute and its meaning, 
so that we may note the difference between it and the statute 
of limitations.
“Statutes of Limitation have been well denominated statutes 
of repose. They proceed upon the maxim that legal rights 
should be asserted within a reasonable time, and that the law 
should favor the vigilant and not the sluggish; but the common 
law fixed no precise time within which actions must be brought. 
This is everywhere done by statute; and such statutes are 
called statutes of limitation. They have been found to be 
highly expedient, that Courts of Chancery, though not always 
within their letter, have been uniformly governed by their 
spirit. All American statutes of limitation are much alike, 
being copies, more or less exact, of the same original; namely, 
the English statute of limitations And the federal courts are 
uniformly governed by the statutes of limitation of the state 
where the cause of action accrued, and by the constructions 
thereof given by the courts of such state.” (Walker’s Am. Law, 
p. 651.)
In the case of Tourtelotte v Pearce, 42 N.-W., 915, Judge 
Maxwell, of the Nebraska Supreme Court, in speaking of the 
statute of limitations, said:
“ The statute is one of repose, and it is safe to assume that 
any person who claims a title or interest in the land in opposi­
tion to that of the party in possession, will assert it within the 
time fixed by statute. The security of titles and welfare of
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society are best promoted by closing the doors of the courts 
against stale claims, which, experience has shown, spring up at 
great distance of time, when important witnesses are dead, or 
material evidence is lost or destroyed. These stale claims in 
many cases are brought up for a trifle, or litigated as a specula­
tion and without any real merit in them. The statute, therefore, 
was designed to protect the occupant in possession of land as 
owner, and make his title complete after ten years of such 
possession.”
This statute of limitations provides in substance that no action 
of ejectment, or any other action for the recovery of the title 
or possession of real estate shall be maintained after the period 
of ten years after the cause of such action accrued. It is not 
within the scope of this paper to discuss the few exceptions to 
this arising from the disabilities of him who should bring 
action.
The object of this statute is to discourage negligence in the 
assertion of claims, and prevent the raking up of dormant 
titles; and the consequence of its enactment is, that if any 
person has been in exclusive adverse possession of land for the 
space of ten years, or the additional time allowed in case of 
disability, although he had no shadow of title at first, yet by 
the mere effect of occupancy for this length of time his title 
has become impregnable. But this occupancy must be what is 
termed adverse; that is, one which disclaims the title of the 
negligent owner; for if it be in subordination thereto, the limi­
tation of the statute does not apply.
According to the common law title to land was said to exist 
“ When a man shows that he and those under whom he claims 
have immemorially used to enjoy the lands that he claims.” 
Early English statutes substituted a fixed and definite period 
for the term “ immemorial usage ” by providing that an uninter­
rupted enjoyment for sixty years should confer an absolute 
and indefeasable title to land.
Judge Hooker, of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in speak­
ing of this subject, says: “ In an old and well settled country, 
where the land is all reduced to possession and under cultiva­
tion, holdings adverse to the true owner for a long period 
would probably be few, while in a new and sparsely inhabited
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country where much land is unoccupied and covered by 
forest, and possibly owned by persons living at a distance, such 
holdings may reasonably be expected to be more numerous.”
The short period usual in this country—ten years in Iowa— 
where, from the nature of things, the owner of land would 
seem to require more protection against unwarranted appropri­
ation, is in striking contrast to that of England, where, as 
already implied, the necessity for a long period of limitation 
would seem to be less.
This question of adverse possession is a question of fact for 
the jury under the instruction of the court. It must be exclu­
sive of any other right; but it need not be under claim of valid  
title. To define the term negatively we may note that there 
are four classes of cases where the possession by another is not 
adverse to that of the owner.
First. When both parties claim under the same title as by 
the same descent, devise, or conveyance, the possession of one 
is not, of itself, adverse to the other, but requires some posi­
tive act or declaration to make it so.
Second. When the possession of one party is consistent 
with the title of the other, it is not of itself adverse, but 
requires other circumstances to make it so; as where a grantor 
remains in possession after conveyance, or where the benefic­
iary is in possession instead of the trustee, or the mortgagor 
after the execution of the mortgage; in all these cases the 
presumption is against adverse possession.
Third. Where the other party has never, in contemplation 
of law, been out of possession, the actual possession is not 
of itself adverse. Thus a tenant for >ears, at will or at suffer­
ance, does not, unless by some positive demonstration, hold 
adversely to his landlord; and the possession of one tenant in 
common, unless there be an actual oustzr, is the possession of 
all. See Bader v Dyer 106 la., 715.
Fourth. Where the possessor has once acknowledged the 
title of the other party, as by offering to purchase, paying 
rent, requesting a lease, and the like, the possession is not 
adverse; nor can it be rendered so by a subsequent denial; 
and this doctrine of acknowledgment extends even to the 
predecessors of him in possession.
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With these explanations it may be laid down as a general 
rule that where neither party can show any other than a pos­
sessory title, the prior possession, however short, is the better 
one, unless the defendant has been in possession so long as to 
be protected by the statute of limitations; but against a regular 
paper title no possession short of the statutory period will 
avail, this being the term fixed for the acquirement of title; 
and the title thus acquired is so conclusive that a person out 
of possession may recover upon a prior possession, for the 
period of the statute, against a regular paper title with posses­
sion for a less period. But it is held that possession of govern­
ment land before a patent has been issued, even for the statutory 
period, is not protected by the statute, because the statute does 
not run against the government.
This point, among others, was at issue in the case of Jones v 
Hockman, as reported in the 12th Iowa Supreme Court Reports, 
page ioi. The case involved the ownership and possession of 
lands in Lee County. Jones had his title direct from the 
government. Hockman’s grantors had acquired a settler’s 
right 20 years previous to the time that action was brought, 
and this right had been transferred to him in a regular manner. 
The plaintiff brought action to recover possession of certain 
lands. The defendant plead the statute of limitations. A ver­
dict and judgment was rendered for the defendant and plaintiff 
appealed. J. M. Beck and D. F. Miller were attorneys for the 
appellant. The following points are taken from the brief Mr. 
Beck presented to the Supreme C ourt:
“ I. The Statute of Limitations is not available as a defense, 
unless the defendant has had the actual adverse possession of 
the premises in question for the time limited by the statute in 
which the action was commenced; Wright v Keitliler, 7 la., 93; 
Angel on Lim., 467; 3 Cruise Dig. 467.
“II. What is meant by the term '‘adversepossession and who 
are said to be in the ‘adverse possession of lands’?
“ (1) The term is a modern one, and its import and meaning 
may be better understood and explained by reference to English 
decisions upon the Statute of Limitations, and by considering 
the common law terms used in those decisions.
“(2) Who, under the English decisions, could have the benefit
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of the Statute of Limitations? ‘The Statute of Limitations 
does not bar a man but where there is an actual disseisin’ ; 3 
Lord Raymond 830 (Reading v Rawstern). ‘Disseisin is where 
a man enters into any lands or tenements, where his entry is 
not congeable, i. e. done with permission or leave, (Bouvier’s L. 
Die.) and ousts him who has the freehold’; 2 Bac. Abr. 678.
“ (3) A disseisin is where one enters intending to usurp the 
possession and oust another of the freehold ; Co. Litt. 153.
“ (4) By the common law one was invested of a freehold by 
livery o f seisin ; he was divested of such estate by disseisin.
“ (5) It will be remarked that the term disseisin does not 
apply to the possession of the lands only, nor does the term 
seisin apply to the possession only ; they both apply to the 
title or tenure of the lands held by the tenant seised or one 
disseised. One put in possession of land as a tenant for years 
or at will would not receive that possession by the ceremony 
of livery of seisin ; neither could it be said that one usurping 
his possession is a disseisor. Disseisin, then, is depriving the 
tenant of his tenure, and with that intent, usurping the posses­
sion—the setting up of a claim or title to the land and under 
that claim entering into the possession thereof.
“(6) In case of disseisin, then, the disseisor claimed title also; 
here was a contest of titles—an existence of adverse claims. The 
disseisor when in possession of the land, held it by or under his 
title, which was adverse to the disseised ; his possession was held 
under his title, and, of course, was an adverse possession.
“ (7) The first use of the term ‘adverse possession,’ I find, is 
in Campbell v Wilson, 3 East. 302, and it is applied there to a 
right of way which was enjoyed and possessed adversely as to 
the owner of the land for twenty years, which was held as an 
evidence o f a grant. After this case, which is often quoted, the 
term seems almost entirely to have superseded the older and 
strictly technical word, ‘disseisin.’
“ (8) The two terms are almost synonymous, and the former, 
i. e. adverse possession, is most generally used in all cases I 
have consulted arising under the Statute of Limitations. The 
best definition of the terms I have seen are found in Angel on 
Limitations, page 473, and is in these words : “ Disseisin and
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adverse holding is an actual, visible and exclusive appropria­
tion of land, commenced and continued under a claim of right/  
This definition is sustained by cases hereinafter quoted.
“HI. Entering upon land under prete?ise of title or under claim 
hostile to the true owner constitutes adverse possession. Brandt 
ex dem. Wolton v Ogden,\ John., 155; Jackson ex dem. Griswold v 
Bond, 5 1 1 1 ., 230; Jackso?i ex dem. Bormel et al. v Sharp, 9 1 1 1 ., 162* 
Kenebeck Purchase v Springer, 4 Mass., 416-418; Bosto?i M ill Cor­
poration v Bulfinch, 6 1 1 1 ., 229; Kenebeck Purchase v Lab are e, 2 
Greenl., 275.
“IV. Quiet possession of land is not adverseholding. Pejep- 
scot Proprietors v Nichols, 1 Fairfield (10 Maine), p.259. Angel 
on Limitations, 478.
“V. Squatters on land, claiming no interest in it, hold under 
the legal title and not adversely. Bell v Fry et al., 5 Dana, 344-5.
“VI. Adverse possession can in no case exist unless there 
rests with the possession a claim on the part of the possessor 
of title or right. Whatever may be the length of time the 
land may be occupied, however quiet may have been the 
occupancy, whatever may have been the acts of ownership 
exercised, unless the possessor set up some claim of title or 
right he will not have adverse possession. La Frambois v Jackson, 
8 Cow., 596; Bradstreet v Huntington, 5 Pet., 440; Jackson v Wheat, 
18 John., 44; Angel on Lim., 476; Jackson ex dem. Sparksma?i v 
Porter, 1 Paine (C. C.), 467; Ricard v Williams et al, 7 Wheat., 59. 
The quo animo is the test of the adverse possession—the inten­
tion to assert some claim or right to the land inconsistent with, 
and hostile to, the owner’s title. Without this adverse claiming 
there can be no adverse holding. (See authorities last quoted.)
“VII. Another well understood principle of the law is applic­
able to the case at bar, namely: Every person is in the legal 
seisin of lands who has title thereto, and this seisin continues 
until he is ousted by one under claim of title, and so continues 
until an adverse possession is made out. Jackson v Selleck, 8 
John., 270; M clverv Regan, 2 Wheat., 24; Frambois v Jackson, 
8 Cow., 589; United States v Arredondo, 6 Pet., 742.
“VIII. His possession will give thedefendant,then, no benefit 
of the Statute of Limitations, unless it was begun or takep and 
held under claim of title. If it begun as a trespass and is con­
tinued by permission or the negligence of the owner of the
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soil, the legal seisin is by the law presumed never to have been 
disturbed, and the holder of the land is presumed to occupy it 
under the real owner. He is in fact a tenant holding the land 
at the pleasure of him in whom the fee rests. (See Bell v Eryr 
5 Dana, 344-5, and authorities last quoted).
“ IX. Possession,accompanied with a claim of ownership in 
fee, may be deemed prima facie evidence of such an estate. In 
such a case it is not the possession alone, but that it is accom­
panied with the claim of the fee, which gives this effect by 
construction of law to acts of the party. Possession per se is 
evidence of no more than the mere fact of present occupation 
by right. Hence the declarations of the party in possession 
are always admitted to show the extent and nature of the case; 
it must depend on these collateral circumstances to ascertain 
the extent of his interest. Jackso?i ex dem. Sparksma?i v Porter, 
1 Paine (C. C.), 467; Ricard v Williams et al, 7 Wheat., 59.
V |/ ^  ^  ^  ^
“XI. Adverse possession must be clearly and strictly proven, for 
the presumption always is that the possession is in accordance 
with the regular title, until there is clear and positive evidence 
to the contrary. Fete v Doe, 1 Blackf., 129.
“XII. An offer to purchase the land by the one in possession 
will disprove his adverse holding. 1 Hilliard Real Prop., 86.’’
Judge Baldwin, in ruling on this case, said: “ There must be 
an adverse, achialpossessio?i, in order to avail the defendant under 
his plea. To constitute an adverse possession there must be 
some claim or color of title under which the defendant has, in 
good faith, supposed he had a right to the property, and under 
which he continued in possession.” It was shown that defend­
ant’s grantors did not claim the fee simple, but occupied under 
what was termed a “ settler’s righ t” ; and the judgment of the 
lower court was reversed.
In the case of Grube v Wells, 34 la., 148, the ruling of the 
court is in perfect harmony with the principles noted in Mr. 
Beck’s brief, and some additional points are also mentioned. 
In this case the plaintiff was the owner of lot 260 in the 
northern addition to the city of Burlington, and the defendant 
owned lot 1 in Wood’s sub-division, which adjoined plaintiff’s 
lot on the south. About twenty-five years prior to the time of 
bringing the action, the defendant’s grantor inclosed lot 1, and
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made other improvements upon it. The fence on the north 
was set about fifteen feet over the line upon lot 260, which was 
uninclosed, and remained in that condition for about twenty 
years. Defendant and her grantor had had actual possession 
and exercised rights of ownership over the strip of land in 
controversy since it was inclosed, but had never had any other 
right or color of title than such as resulted from the possession 
stated. They had held the land under the belief that it was 
covered by the deeds conveying to them lot 1, and were not 
informed otherwise, until within about one year prior to the 
time of the suit, when, upon an accurate survey having been 
made, the true line was established. There was no dispute 
about the other boundaries of lot 1, and the defendant’s title 
and possession to the whole of it had never been questioned. 
Defendant had paid taxes continuously on lot 1, and plaintiff 
on lot 260.
In the district court judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. 
The defendant appealed. In the supreme court the judgment 
was affirmed. Chief Justice Beck made the following rulings:
“ I. The Statute of Limitations is not available as a defense 
in an action of right, unless the defendant has held possession 
of the land for the statutory period, under color of title or 
claim of right. Mere possession is not sufficient.
“2. The quo animo, or intention in which the possession was 
taken and held by the defendant, is an essential consideration. 
It must be shown that he intended to hold in hostility to the 
true owner.
“3. The facts relied upon to constitute adverse possession 
cannot be presumed, but must, in all cases, be strictly proved.
•‘4. The claim of right must be as broad as the possession. 
It was accordingly held where defendant’s claim was limited to 
a lot of a certain number, but his possessions extended to and 
covered a part of an adjacent lot embraced in his inclosure, 
that this did not amount to an adverse possession of the latter.
“5. A mere belief that the lot which defendant claimed 
extended to the limits of the inclosure is not equivalent to a 
claim of title or right, and therefore not sufficient to constitute 
adverse possession.”
In order that possession may be legally interpreted as being
1 3TITLE BY POSSESSION
“adverse,” each of several different elements must enter there­
in; some of these elements have already been mentioned; 
others are mentioned in the following extracts from rulings of 
our own‘supreme court:
“The possession of land which will impart not ice of title 
thereto must be adverse, exclusive, open, unequivocal and 
notorious, and must be inconsistent with the claim of any other 
person. Elliott v Lane, 82 la., 484.”
“Possession to be adverse must be actual,continuous, visible,, 
notorious, distinct and hostile, and under claim of right or 
color of title. Hempstead v Huffman, 84 la., 398.”
“Possession of land for five years claiming title adverse to the 
owner is not sufficient to constitute a defense to an action to 
quiet title. The possession must be exclusive, actual, openr 
notorious and under color of title or claim of right for ten 
years to be available. Des Moines a?id Ft. Dodge Ry. Co. v Bid- 
lard, 89 la., 749.”
“The possession to be adverse must be actual, continued,, 
visible, notorious, distinct and hostile, and commenced under 
claim or color of title; but actual residence on the land is not 
necessary to constitute such possession; any acts which are 
open and notorious, done under claim or color of title and 
continued for the necessary time, will justify the finding of 
adverse possession. Robinson v Lake, 14 la., 421. Boothw Sm allr 
25 la., 177.”
In a country where the land has been for a long time possessed 
and held by the settlers there would ordinarily be but little 
difficulty in determining whether the occupancy was such as to 
conform to the popular understanding of these terms, render­
ing it easy to ascertain whether it was such an occupancy that 
it could be properly said to amount to possession. But the 
conditions in this country have been and still are radically 
different from those in the mother country, and they have 
affected the law of this subject, which has been modified with 
a view to adapting it to altered conditions.
What then constitutes actual possession? Ordinarily this 
would seem to be easily determined, as in the case of a small 
farm under cultivation and all fenced. But consider the case 
of a woods pasture, remote from a dwelling, or of a marsh
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where hay is annually cut, or upon which cattle graze. Suppose 
that a man should occasionally enter the aforementioned woods 
pasture and cut and haul therefrom loads of wood. Who could 
determine whether he was attempting to hold theland adversely, 
or whether his particular adverse possesssion was exercised on 
the wood only? Had he cut a considerable amount of wood 
and corded it up on the ground near by, such action might be 
construed as evidence of adverse holding. So in the case of 
the hay land, had he cut and stacked hay thereon, a similar 
presumption would naturally exist. But suppose his cattle had 
been grazing over the land in common with other cattle, and 
that the range included other lands; adverse possession could 
hardly arise against the true owner. There are several decisions 
bearing upon these and similar points, to some of which atten­
tion is here called.
“It is not necessary that the occupation should be such that a 
mere stranger passing by the land would know that some one 
was asserting title to and dominion over it. It is not necessary 
that the land be cleared or fenced or any building be placed 
upon it. La?igworthy \  Myers, 4 la., 18; Booth v Small, 25 la. 177.”
“If a person enters upon a land under deed from another 
claiming to be the owner, and uses it thereafter as a wood lot 
appurtenant to his farm, in the usual and ordinary way, and 
exercises such acts of ownership over it as is necessary to enjoy 
such usual and ordinary use of a wood lot, such acts being 
continuous and uninterrupted would amount to actual posses­
sion, and such possession being under color of title and a claim 
of right, and exclusive, and held so openly and notoriously 
that the community would understand and recognize his claim 
of ownership, will be adverse; and if continued for ten years 
without interruption will bar the claim of the true owner, 
Murray v Hudson and another, 32 N.-W., 889.”
“The defendant in an action for trespass upon wild land can 
not maintain his defense of the title by prescription, in the 
premises, by proving that for twenty years his cattle placed 
on his own land, adjoining the disputed premises, went upon 
the latter and used it, as well as his own land, as a pasture; 
that he repaired a road running through the disputed premises, 
which he used in going to and from his own land, and from
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time to time during the twenty years had cut one or two cords 
of wood upon the disputed premises, and had allowed it to 
remain on the land. Richmo?idIro?i Works v Wadliams, 9 N. E., 1.”
Possession must be continued.
Little need be said upon this division of the subject. Actual 
uninterrupted possession may ripen into a perfect title; but if 
a t  any time during the statutory period an interval occurs in 
such actual possession, it is fatal. But possession is not broken 
by sale or transfer, provided the grantee takes possession when 
the grantor goes out; the grantor’s possession inures in such 
cases to the benefit of the grantee.
“The term ‘continued’ may, however, mean intermittent, when 
the natural use to which the property is put is of an intermit­
tent character. It is not necessary to actually occupy unbroken 
prairie land during the winter season in order that there may 
be adverse possession thereof. It is sufficient to occupy it 
during the proper season for grazing and making hay. Dice v 
Brown, 67 N.-W., 253.”
“On the other hand, merely paying taxes upon wild lands and 
occasionally looking at them and showing them to others, held 
not such actual, visible, notorious, adverse possession as is 
necessary to enable a party to take advantage of the statute. 
Brow?i v Rose, 48 la., 231.”
“ Payment of taxes is mere evidence of a claim and its extent; 
it is not of itself adverse possession. Sioux City a?id I. F. Town 
Lot, etc., Co. v Wilson, 50 la., 422.”
“ A roving possession from one part of a tract of land to the 
other will not constitute adverse possession as to any part of 
the land which has not been held adversely for the statutory 
period. Messer v Reginnetter, 32 la., 312.”
Seemingly somewhat at variance with this decision is the one 
in Watters v Connelly, 59 la., 217, which says: “Actual possession 
of a part of a tract is legal possession of the whole of the 
tract covered by the title under which the actual possession is 
taken, and possession of the part will impart notice of the claim 
to the whole tract;” (see also Libbey v You?ig, 103 la., 258) but 
the essential difference is that, in the second case, actual pos­
session of a part is taken, while the claim of title is broad 
enough to cover the whole tract, whereas the roving possession
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mentioned in the first case can not be construed as actual 
possession of a definite tract.
“A title being once obtained by reason of ten years’ adverse 
holding, it is then unnecessary that the possession be main­
tained continuously thereafter. Where title is obtained by 
adverse possession, such title must be presumed to continue 
until it is divested in some manner recognized by law. It may 
be sold and conveyed, and the party against whom it has 
become perfect can do nothing to in any manner impair it. 
The party in whom such title has become perfect will be deemed 
to be in possession, and actual occupancy is not essential to its 
continuance. Heinrichs v Terrell, 65 la., 25.”
The possession must be visible, distinct and notorious. The 
cases already referred to have pretty thoroughly indicated the 
character of the interpretations to be placed upon these terms. 
Of course, a clandestine or concealed occupancy will not avail, 
but the occupancy must be open to the observation of all, that 
is, it must be distinct and of a character inconsistent with a 
recognition of another title. It must be such as to involve 
plain evidence of dominion over land. A claim of possession, 
which is not so manifested as to be known and understood by 
others in the vicinity, could hardly be said to be visible, distinct 
and notorious.
“The acts relied on as showing actual possession must be such 
that, on the one hand, the fair inference is that they were done 
because the doer thereof claimed title or ownership in the 
premises, and, on the other hand, they must be such as would 
naturally lead any one interested in the land to understand that 
they were done by some one who was claiming title in the 
premises. M errill v Tobin, 30 Fed., 738.”
“The possession must be hostile, that is, it must be in the 
assertion of a right which is inconsistent with ownership by the 
plaintiff, one which does not recognize, but from its character 
disputes his rights to an entry and occupancy without asking 
the defendant’s permission, or at least implying his consent; 
one that disregards the plaintiff and his title, and one which, 
from the acts committed, implies the assertion of dominion as 
contradistinguished from an intention to commit a trespass.”
“A man may hunt or fish on his neighbor’s land every day 
without intending to claim the land—or he may do it in such
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a way (as by the erection of a permanent structure for the pur­
pose of leaving his property there, asserting his ownership to 
others, denying the right of the true owner, etc.,) as to clearly 
indicate an adverse possession, rather than a trespass.”
In the case of McNamee v Moreland, 26 la., 97, the court gave 
a ruling which practically touched and partially, at least, 
explains all of these terms. It said, “A party relying upon 
the bar of the statute of limitations, in an action for the 
recovery of real property, must show that he has held for the 
statutory period, not only by a possession actual, open and 
adverse, but that it has been maintained as a right resulting 
from an exclusive property in and dominion over the estate, 
and not subordinate to the will of another, or by an agreement 
with the true owner of the title.”
Section No. 3004 of the revised code forbids, however, the 
admission of evidence of use of any easement for the purpose 
of establishing that the enjoyment of the use was under an 
adverse claim; that is, evidence other than that of use is 
required to establish the fact of adverse claim.
The section referred to reads: “ In all actions hereafter
brought, in which title to any easement in real estate shall be 
claimed by virtue of adverse possession thereof, for the period 
of ten years, the use of the same shall not be admitted as 
evidence that the party claimed the easement as his right, but 
the fact of adverse possession shall be established by evidence 
distinct from and independent of its use, and that the party 
against whom the claim is made had express notice thereof, 
and these provisions shall apply to public as well as private 
claims.”
It will be well to note that this section refers to title of an 
easement, and not to the title or possession of real property. 
By easements are meant rights or privileges relating to the land 
of other persons; that is, certain rights and privileges con­
nected with land, but belonging to different persons from the 
proprietors of the land. Public easements comprehend all 
such as are open and free to the enjoyment of every citizen; 
they apply chiefly to commons or parks, roads and rivers. 
Private easements comprehend all those which belong to par­
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ticular individuals. They relate chiefly to the use of land, 
water, air and light.
“One of the most important private easements, and one most 
nearly allied to the discussion in hand, is the right of private 
way over another’s ground. This right may arise in three ways: 
from contract, from prescriptions, or from necessity.”
“The provisions of the section of the code referred to have no 
application to cases where the title by prescription had become 
perfected before the enactment of that statute. McAllister v 
Pickup, 84 la., 65.”
It is in regard to establishing the title to these easements 
by adverse claim that section 3004 declares that the party 
against whom the claim is made shall have had express notice 
thereof. No notice of possession of corporeal property to 
the party against whom the possession is adverse is required; 
from the very nature of the case such notice is not necessary 
In the case of Close et al v Samm et al, 27 la., 503, Judge Cole 
ruled that “ To constitute adverse possession under which a 
title may be acquired, it is not necessary that such possession 
should be known to the other party. The title derived or for­
feited by possession arises from the fact of the actual, adverse 
and continuous possession, and not from the notice of it to the 
adverse party. He must take notice of it at his peril.” Simi­
larly in Teaboutv Daniels, 38 la., 158, “ adverse possession must 
be open and notorious, and if so, the person against whom it 
is maintained is presumed, as a matter of fact, to know it.”
We come now to a consideration of the terms color of title, 
claim of right, etc., which is probably one of the most difficult 
parts of the entire subject.
That some sort of a claim must exist in order to render 
effective an adverse holding is very apparent, judging from 
the language of the law and the court rulings, but the writer is 
not able to state exactly what is the maximum limit of the 
gauzy character of these claims, so that they may still retain 
their potency. “A mere possession without color of claim of an 
adverse title will not enable a defendant in an action of right 
to avail himself of the statute of limitations. Jo?ies v Hockman, 
12 la., 101.” Also in McNamee v Moreland, 26 la., 97.it was 
ruled that: “ It is a material and essential requisite of adverse
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possession that the occupancy has been with the intention to 
claim title, and as disproving this intent, it is competent to 
show by the declarations of the occupant that he did not hold 
adversely.”
In the case of Montgomery Co. v James Severson et al, 64 la., 
326, these points seem to have been directly in issue, as a num­
ber of rulings were rendered thereon, as follows:
“ It is not necessary for one relying upon the statute of limi­
tations to show a legal title; a claim of right to the land is 
sufficient. And this claim need not be based upon a legal title 
or a paper title; it may rest in parol. A claim based upon an 
equity is sufficient.” Sfto. Hamilton et al v Wright, 30 la., 480; 
also in this case, the following rulings were made:
“ To constitute an adverse possession under our statute it is 
not necessary that the party must have taken and held posses­
sion under color of title. It is sufficient if such possession was 
taken and held under claim of title.
“ The terms ‘color of title’ and ‘claim of title’ are not synony­
mous. To constitute the former, a paper title is requisite in 
the party claiming, but the latter may exist wholly in parol.
“To constitute color of title it is not requisite that the title 
under which the party claims should be a valid one, and it is 
immaterial whether its want of validity results from its original 
and inherent defects, or from matters transpiring subsequently, 
nor whether such want of validity is attributable to individual 
or judicial action.”
Judge Beck, in discussing the case of the C.,R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v 
Alfree, 64 la., 500, said: “A claim or color of title may be based 
upon void acts, proceedings and deeds. They may have in 
law no effect; yet being in the form which in the absence of 
matter invalidating them would render them of effect, they 
have the semblance of regularity, which is sufficient to support 
the pretense that they confer title or right. The term ‘color’ 
means ‘semblence,’ ‘show,’ ‘pretense,’ ‘appearance,’ and implies, 
in the language of law, that the thing to which it is applied has 
not the real character imputed to it. Hence to give ‘color of 
title’ in pleading is to allege a fictitious matter which gives the 
appearance of title, and is avoided by allegations setting up 
the real and valid title. * * * The term ‘color of title,’
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used to designate a claim of title, under which lands are held, 
that will support the defense based upon the statute of limita­
tions, implies that the title thus described is not valid, but is 
claimed to be by the party holding under it. Invalid titles are 
not distinguished by the consideration of the sources and 
reasons of their invalidity. If a title fails to confer the rights 
of property upon the claimant it is invalid. If it be invalid 
because the grantor in the instrument had no title, or had no 
authority to convey the title, or for any other reason, it is void. 
In the case before us the tax deeds pretend to convey the title 
to the land in question. They fail to do so because the title of 
the land was in the United States.”
The Court held in this case, “ that a party claiming under a 
tax deed which was void for the reason that the title of the 
land was in the United States Government at the time of the 
levy on it, and therefore not taxable, constituted color of title, 
and might be pleaded as raising the bar of the statute of limi­
tations.”
“Deeds of conveyance, purporting to convey the land to the 
person in possession, are evidence of color of title, although 
they are informal and indefinite in description. It is not 
necessary that they be sufficient to convey the title. Safer v 
Meadows, 68 la., 507.”
“But in order that an informal instrument shall constitute 
color of title it must appear that it was relied upon as the source 
of title. Moore v Antill, 53 la., 612.”
“A tax deed, void on its face, is sufficient to give color of title.
Colvin v McCune, 39 la., 502.”
“A descent cast, or a devise, gives color of title, although the 
ancestor or devisor was a mere trespasser. Hamilton v Wright, 
30 la., 480.”
“A party claiming under a quit claim deed, though he is not 
regarded as a good faith purchaser, nevertheless has sufficient 
color of title to enable him to set up adverse possession. 
Tremaine v Weatherby, 58 la., 615.”
“A quit claim deed from one claiming under a tax deed, 
though insufficient to pass a good title, gives one in possession 
under it color of title.” Washburn on Real Property, vol. 3, 
p. 136.
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In Close v Samm , 27 la., 503, Judge Cole ruled as follows: 
“ To constitute color of title and adverse possession thereunder, 
it is not necessary that the party in possession should hold 
under a valid and perfect title. He may in good faith acquire 
a title by adverse possession to a strip of land which is, in fact, 
beyond his lines, as established by his deed or patent, and upon 
that of an adjacent owner.” The Judge in illustrating the 
application of the above principle used the following hypothet­
ical case: “A has a patent for the south half of a certain
section of land and B for the north half of the same section. 
A in building a fence sets the same five rods, more or less, upon 
B’s land, claiming, however, that it is the true line, and he 
maintains it there for the time requisite to bar an action. Now 
it is no answer to A ’s claim for B to say that the true line to 
which only A was authorized to go was below his fence, and 
therefore his patent could not afford him a color of title or 
claim above his true line. If it was a sufficient answer, then 
adverse possession, which required a color of title to make it 
available, could never bar an action. In other words, it is not 
necessary that the title of a party in possession of property 
shall be valid and perfect in order to enable him to rely upon 
the statute of limitations. In such case he has no need of the 
statute. It is only when he has gone beyond his legal right 
that the statute is of service to him. Of course he must make 
the claim in good fa ith , and not in wantonness.”
We come now to a consideration of that portion of the sub­
ject which is more especially interesting to surveyors, that is, 
adverse possession growing out of mistakes in the location of 
boundary lines between adjacent properties.
In the case of Burdick v Heivly, 23 la., 511, the opinion was 
rendered that “ One of the objects of the statute of limitations 
is to compose controversies growing out of mistakes and errors 
which tend to keep open, indefinitely, the settlement of titles 
and render them insecure and uncertain.” In the same case 
another principle was announced which has been generally 
accepted, viz: “ Where adjoining owners of real estate were at 
a loss to know where the dividing line was, which was, however; 
finally agreed upon, and a fence erected thereon at-che-mutual 
cost of both parties, followed by actual possession and claim
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of ownership which was acquiesced in for more than ten years, 
it was held that these facts should be regarded as establishing 
the defense of the statute of limitations, although it appeared 
that the division line agreed upon was erroneous, and that the 
possession and claim of ownership was the result of this mis­
take.”
Similarly in the case of Heinrichs v Terrell, 65 la., 25, “Where 
a division line is agreed upon by the persons owning adjoining 
real estate and possession is taken in accordance with such 
agreement, such possession must be considered as adverse from 
the time it was taken.”
“Where parties have established a line and used it as a bound­
ary, irrespective of the true line, the possession will be adverse, 
and after the lapse of the necessary period, conclusive upon 
the parties and their grantees. H iatt v Kirkpatrick, 48 la., 78.”
“If a party owning on one side of a division line has been in 
peaceable possession, and claimed up to the partition line, and 
cultivated it as his, claiming adversely to all the world for 
more than ten years, then his title to the strip of land on his 
side of such division line, which may not previously have 
belonged to him, becomes complete by adverse possession. 
Brown v Bridges, 31 la., 138.”
“To constitute adverse possession the claim must be as broad 
as the possession, else the holder cannot be said to be holding 
under claim of right, hostile to the true owner. If the claim is 
of right to a fence, without regard to whether that fence is on 
the party line, it will be deemed hostile. Dolittle v Bailey, 85 
la., 3 9 8 .”
“No formal claim of ownership to a fence is necessary on the 
part of one whose possession and ownership up to the fence 
are unquestioned, in order to make such possession adverse. 
Fullmer v Beck, 105 la., 517.”
The courts, however, do not seem to recognize mistakes in 
boundary lines and claims based thereon, as the following 
decisions clearly indicate :
“An owner of; land, wha, through ignorance of the dividing 
line^ includes a.part of an.-adjoining tract within his inclosure, 
doss not hold such portion by adverse possession so as to set
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the statute of limitations in motion. Skinner v Crazvford, 54 
la., 119.”
“Where the possession with reference to a boundary line is by 
reason of a mutual mistake as to the true line, such possession 
will not be deemed adverse, so as to give rise to a title by 
prescription. Heinz v Cramer, 84 la., 497.”
“Where parties occupied under a mistaken belief that the line 
located between them was correct, and neither intended to 
claim more than the true amount, plaintiff did not hold excess 
adversely. Kalil v Schmidt, 107 la., 550.”
“The occupation of a strip of land by reason of a mistake as 
to the true boundary line between adjoining owners will not 
constitute adverse possession thereof. Mills v Pemiy, 74 la., 
172; Goldsborough v Pidduck, 87 la., 599.”
“When possession to a line is claimed under the belief that it 
is the true line, such possession is not adverse if the line is, by 
mistake, not the true boundary. Jordan v Fem e, 70 N. W., 611.” 
“In case of mistake as to the boundary line, the possession of 
the party against whom the mistake exists will not be deemed 
adverse. Mere mistake does not make the possession one 
under claim of right. Grube v Wells. 34 la.. 148; Wacha v Brown, 
78 la., 432.”
Coming now to a discussion of adverse possession of high­
ways by individuals, and that of land for highway purposes by 
the public, we find conflicting authorities.
In Davies v Huebner, 45 la., 574, Judge Rothrock said: “ It is 
claimed by the plaintiff that the statute of limitations does not 
run against the public or the state, and that the adverse posses­
sion for more than ten years does not extinguish the right. 
There is a want of harmony in the adjudicated cases upon this 
subjeet. Quite a number of cases declare that the public may 
lose their right to streets, roads and other public places by 
long continued adverse occupation. See Washburn on Ease­
ments and Servitudes, pp. 669-70, and authorities there cited.” 
“On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and 
of other states have held that no adverse possession and use of 
a public highway by individuals, however long continued, will 
give title as against the state or the general public, as the 
statute of limitations does not run against them. Com. v
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Albner, i Whart., Pa. 469-488; Philadelphia v Railroad Company, 
58 Pa. St., 253; Simmons v Cornell, 1 Rhode Island, 519; Jersey 
City v Morris Canal Company, 1 Beasley N. J. 547.”
“ We believe the weight of authority is that the statute does 
not run against the general public because of tjie adverse 
possession of a highway established in the manner prescribed 
by law. Whether this rule should prevail in this state we do 
not determine; and yet we believe there are cases where the 
non-user has continued for such a length of time, and private 
rights of such a character have been acquired by long-continued 
adverse possession, and the consequent transfer of lands by 
purchase and sale, that justice demands that the public should 
be estopped from asserting the right to the highway.
“ The first requisite to establish such estoppel should be that 
the adverse possession should continue for ten years, by 
analogy to the statute of limitations. Then it should be shown 
that there was a total abandonment of the road for at least 
the period of ten years.”
“The claim of the public to the use of a strip of land as a 
highway may be lost by sufficiently long-continued adverse 
possession in good faith, without any notice of the claims of 
the public. Smith v Gorrell, 81 la., 218.”
In Davies v Hziebner, mentioned above, Judge Rothrock 
further ruled that “ Where a highway has been established by 
the proper legal authority although never actually opened, 
mere non-user for a period of ten years, will not operate to 
defeat the right of the public therein, where there has been no 
adverse use of the land. Barlow v C., R. I. & P. R. R., 29 la., 
276; Noll v The Dubuque, B. & M. R . R. Co., 32 la., 66. But 
where there has been an entire non-user of a highway for a 
period of thirty years, and half of the same in width had been 
inclosed, fenced and in open, notorious and adverse possession 
for more than ten years, it was held that the public would be 
estopped to claim any right in the part thus inclosed. The 
other half having been but recently inclosed the right of the 
public thereto had not been impaired.”
However, to gain title by adverse possession against the 
public, all the elements which legally constitute adverse pos­
session must be strictly adhered to.
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“When a strip of land was recognized by the land-owner as a 
highway, by constructing bars at each end thereof for the use 
of the public, and by abstaining from cultivating the same, and 
was used for that purpose by the public, without objection, 
held that although it thus remained inclosed, the owner could 
not claim rights therein adversely to the public by reason of 
his possession. Hempstead v Huffman, 84 la., 398.”
Seemingly opposed to this is the ruling in N eff v Smith, 91 
la., 87: “ The fact that one who claims to have had possession
of a highway, adverse to the public, for such length of time as 
to have acquired adverse title, allowed the public to pass 
through his inclosed premises by letting down and putting up 
bars, will not defeat the claims of adverse possession.” Note, 
however, that in Hempstead v Huffman the land owner recog­
nized a strip of land as a highway, while in N effv  Smith the 
occupant of the land was holding it adversely to all the world, 
but permitting the public to pass over it.
“The maintenance of gates and bars across a travelled way 
indicates an absence of intention to dedicate the way to the 
public use. State v Greeyie, 41 la., 693.”
“An adjoining owner can not acquire title by adverse posses­
sion to a portion of a highway. Being charged with knowledge 
of the width of the highway as fixed by law, his possession 
will not be under claim of right or color of title. Rae v Miller, 
68 N.-W., 899.”
It is thus apparent that some authorities rule that adverse 
possession may arise against the public, but not all are agreed 
on this point. Similarly there are some who maintain that the 
public can not hold adversely to a private individual, con­
sequently that a road cannot be established by prescription, 
because prescription, as the term is ordinarily employed, pre­
supposes a grant from the rightful owner, and the public can 
not take by grant. Angel on Highways, section 131, says: 
“But the correctness of this statement may be doubted, since, 
while it is true that the public as a general undesignated com­
munity may not in strictness take by grant, still, local officers 
and bodies may take for it as trustees. When a highway comes 
into existence, no matter how, it passes at once under control 
of such of the public representatives as the law designates.”
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Elliott in Roads and Streets, chap. VI, says: “It may pos­
sibly be true that the doctrine of prescription, in its strict and 
rigorous force, does not fully apply to roads and streets, but it 
is also true that highways may be created in a manner so nearly 
resembling the ordinary case of a title by prescription that it 
is safe to affirm that highways do exist by prescription. The 
supposition of the existence of a precedent grant” (see page 9, 
item 7) is a pure and useless fiction, and is not needed in any 
case to support the right conferred by adverse possession and 
user. * * * User of way under claim of right for twenty
years will unquestionably confer an easement upon the public, 
whether there is or is not any direct or affirmative act from 
which an intent to set apart the way to the public can be 
inferred, while no dedication not resting wholly or in part on 
lapse of time can be established without some fact indicating 
an intention on the part of the owner to set apart the way to 
the public.”
“A highway may exist in*-this state arising from dedication 
and prescription notwithstanding the provisions of the statute 
for the establishment of highways. Mosier v Vincent, 34 la., 
478; Baldwi?i v Herbst, 54 la., 168.”
“Prescription refers the right to the highway to the pre­
sumption that it was originally established pursuant to the law 
by the proper authority, while dedication refers to a contract 
either expressed or implied. Where there has been an attempt 
to establish a highway, but because of some defect the proceed­
ings are not valid, the owner’s rights would not be impaired, 
nor would any highway be created in case there had been no 
user of the way by the public, and no element of estoppel. If, 
however, the public acting on the claim supplied by such pro­
ceedings had used the way for the requisite period, then there 
would no doubt be a public way. This would be so even 
though the owner at the out set had opposed the establishment 
of the highway. In such a case, the right to the highway 
would be clearly referable to the claim or color of right fur­
nished by the defective proceedings instituted for the laying 
out and opening of the road. If the right to the way depends 
solely upon user, then the width of the way and the extent of 
the servitude is measured by the character of the user, for the
27TITLE BY POSSESSION
easement can not be broader than the user. (See Davis v Clintoti? 
58 la., 389), but if there were defective proceedings, and the use 
was under color of the claim supplied by them, then the extent 
of the easement is to be measured by the claim exhibited by 
proceedings and by them intended to be established.”
“As a general rule before a highway can be established by 
prescription, it must appear that the general public under a 
claim of right, and not by mere permission of the owner, used 
some defined way without interruption or substantial change 
for the statutory period. (See State v. Green, 41 la., 693). * * *
Where the use is merely permissive and not adverse there is 
no basis on which a right of way by prescription can rest.” 
“The use by the public must be general and uninterrupted and 
under claim of right for a period equal to that for the limita­
tions of real actions. State v Tucker, 36 la., 485; Washburn on 
Easements, pp. 121-122.”
“ Ten year’s use of a highway by the public under claim of 
right, will bar the owner of the soil; Keys v Tait, 19 la., 123, 
at least in the absence of proof that the road was used by leave, 
favor, or mistake. Onstott v Miirray, 22 la., 457.
“ To establish a highway by prescription there must be an 
actual public use, general, uninterrupted and continued for 
ten years, under claim of right. State v Greene, 41 la., 693.” 
“ While the public may acquire the right to a highway by 
virtue of adverse possession and use under claim of right, for the 
statutory period the same as an individual, the possession or use 
must nevertheless correspond and be commensurate with the 
claim of right. State v Welpton, 34 la., 144.”
“ Under particular circumstances held that the fact that a road 
on the line, claimed by defendant to be the line of the public 
highway, was worked and traveled by the defendant for twenty- 
five years without objections on the part of the plaintiff, and 
the further fact that plaintiff built and so maintained his 
fences as to indicate an intention not to claim any of the land 
so used as against the publvc, raised a strong presumption in 
favor of defendant’s claim which was not overcome by the 
evidence; and held that even had no steps been taken to estab­
lish a highway on the land in question, in the manner provided 
by law, the court would be justified in finding that it had been
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established by the acts of the plaintiff, and of the public, and 
by the lapse of time. Sherman v Hastings, 81 la., 372.”
So where private roads are laid out on dividing lines each 
property owner may acquire an easement in the land of the 
other by prescription. See M cAllister v Pickup, 84 la., 65. 
“ Where a road was laid out upon a dividing line between the 
lands of the plaintiff and the defendant, and used by them 
and their grantors continuously, openly and notoriously for 
more than forty years, without the right to such use being dis­
puted, and when the defendant after such period fenced up 
said road against the protest of the plaintiff, who asserted his 
right to use said road, held that an easement in said land of 
the defendant had been acquired by prescription.”
In this connection it is well to note section 3006 of the Code 
of Iowa, 1897, which says: “No right of footway, except claimed 
in connection with right to pass with carriages, shall be acquired 
by prescription or adverse use for any length of time.”
“The existence of a highway by prescription is generally 
proved by the parol evidence of witnesses that the road in 
question had been known and used as a highway or road com­
mon to all the people for the necessary period of prescription.” 
Elliot on Roads and Streets, 138.
“To render parol testimony tending to establish a road by 
prescription admissible, it is not necessary that it should first 
be shown that there is no record showing the establishment of 
such road. Mosierw Vince?it, 34 la., 478.”
It has been held by some that the doctrine of adverse pos­
session does not apply to municipal corporations, and that 
consequently no one can acquire title to a street by adverse 
occupation. It seems, however, that upon this point authorities 
are not agreed. The decisions of the highest courts of some 
of the states, notabl) California, Pennsylvania, New York, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island and Louisiana, seem to sustain the 
above idea, while the courts of most of the other states have 
held that the doctrine of adverse possession applies to munic­
ipal corporations the same as to individuals.
In the case of The City o f Pella v Scholte, 24 la., 283, Chief 
Justice Dillon held that “ Where the original proprietor of a 
town held open and visible possession of a square therein for
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the statutory period for the limitation of real actions, claiming 
that he had never relinquished but still retained title thereto, 
that the right of the corporation to maintain an action for the 
recovery thereof was barred;” and stated “ That while the 
Statute of Limitations will not run against the state or sover­
eignty, it may against a municipal corporation.”
In the case of Dudley v Trustees o f Frankfort, 12 Ky., 610, the 
plaintiff claimed the right to a part of the street by adverse 
occupancy. The court in the opinion said: “ If a private citizen 
at any time encroach with his buildings and enclosures upon 
the public streets, the municipal authorities should in the 
exercise of proper vigilance and of their undoubted authority, 
interfere by the legal means provided in their charter to pre­
vent such encroachments in due time, and thus preserve for 
the public use the squares, streets and alleys of the town in 
their original dimensions; but if a private individual or citizen 
has been permitted to remain in the continued adverse, actual 
possession of public grounds or of a public street, or of part 
of a street, as embraced within his inclosure or covered by 
his dwelling or other buildings for a period of twenty years or 
more, without interruption, such citizen will be vested thereby 
with the complete title to the ground actually occupied by 
him; and the title thus perfected by time will be just as avail­
able against a municipal corporation as it would be against an 
individual whose elder title and right of entry may be barred 
by a continued adverse possession of his land for twenty years.” 
In City o f Wheeling v Campbell, 12 W. Va., 36, that Court, after 
a complete and critical review of the conflicting authorities, 
said: “ We see no reason why a municipal corporation should
not be held to the same degree of diligence in guarding 
their streets and squares from encroachments as natural persons 
are in protecting their property from the adverse possession of 
others. We do see great reasons why no time should bar the 
sovereign power because the officers of the sovereign, whether 
king or state, have such various and onerous duties to perform 
that the rights of the sovereign may be neglected; and all the 
people of the kingdom or state are interested in having the 
rights of the sovereign preserved intact, and not subject to be 
impaired or lost by the neglect of officers. But the same
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reason does not apply to a municipal corporation. A city or 
town is a compact community, with its city or town council, 
its committee on streets and alleys and its street commis­
sioners, whose special duty it is to see that the streets, squares 
and alleys are kept in proper order and free from obstructions 
or encroachments, and if with all this machinery and power 
confined to so narrow a compass and the interests of the cor­
poration to exercise it, the city authorities permit an individual 
to encroach upon the streets, alleys or squares of the city and 
hold, enjoy and occupy the same, claiming them as his own 
under his title without interruption or disturbance in that 
right, for the period described in the Statute of Limitations, 
the city not only does, but we think according to reason as 
well as authority ought to lose all right thereto.” Quoted in 
Meyer v City o f Lincoln, 33 Neb., 566. Judge Norval said in ruling 
on this case: “ We are satisfied, upon principle as well as 
authority, that adverse possession by an abutting lot owner of 
a portion of a street in a city for the statutory period of limi­
tations will give a complete title thereto to the occupant. To 
have that effect the possession must be actual, visible, exclu­
sive and uninterrupted for the full period of ten years under a 
claim of right.”
In harmony with this is the ruling in Cambridge v Cook, 66 
N.-W., 884, which says: “A municipal corporation may be 
estopped by allowing land which has been dedicated for streets 
or alleys to be adversely occupied, from making any claim to 
have such street or alley opened.” However, “ Mere neglect 
to use the rights conferred on a municipal corporation by the 
dedication in a plat of ground for an alley will not estop the 
public from asserting its right thereto. Taraldson v Lime 
Springs, 92 la., 187.”
“ Nevertheless, mere occupation of land belonging to a city, 
with full knowledge of the occupant that he has no color of 
right thereto does not give any prescriptive right therein. 
Twilling v Burlington, 68 la., 284.”
In the City o f Waterloo v The Union M ill Co., 72 la., 437, Judge 
Beck drew distinctions as to the kind of cases in which the 
statute of limitations would and would not run. He ruled as 
follows:
“In our opinion the right of the plaintiff and of the public to
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the use and occupancy of the street is not barred by the statute 
of limitations. The city is invested by the legislature with 
governmental powers, and holds the fee of the streets or an 
easement thereon in trust for the public; O ggv City o f Lansi?ig, 
35 la., 495; Calwell v City o f Boone, 51 la., 687; City o f Clinton v 
Cedar Rapids & M. R. R 'y Co., 24 la., 455. The city is but an 
instrument for the exercise of the authority of the state, and its 
municipal powers in establishing and maintaining a street are 
exercised in the discharge of governmental functions. The 
statute of limitations, therefore, will not run to defeat the exer­
cise of its governmental authority. In cases wherein arose 
questions involving property or contracts which do not pertain 
to the exercise of their authority, the statute will run. Davies 
v Huebner, 45 la., 574; City o f Burlington v Burlington & M .R . 
Ry. Co., 41 la., 134. City o f Pella v Scholte, 24 la., 283, Dill. Mun. 
Corp. § 675, and cases cited in notes.”
If a title can be obtained bv. adverse possession which can 
be enjoyed indefinitely, or can be transferred by him who 
thus possesses it, what evidence has he of the right to trans­
fer ? May he have recorded evidence of his title, and what, 
in general, is the legal effect upon him who loses and upon 
him who gains by adverse possession? And to what extent 
may he who acquires title adversely rely upon this title?
Tiedeman on Real Property, sec. 716, says: “The Statute of 
Limitations not only protects the title acquired by adverse pos­
session when it is assailed by plaintiff in an action of ejectment, 
but it may also be relied upon to vindicate his right to posses­
sion where he has been ousted, and he is forced to his action 
to recover possession.”
In Cramer v Clow, 81 la., 255, it was held that “the title 
acquired by prescription through adverse possession is not 
merely defensive, but is for all practical purposes a title, and an 
action to quiet a title founded on such possession may be main­
tained.”
Again in Indepe7ident Dist. v Fagan, 63 N. W., 456, “adverse 
possession of real estate for ten years, under a claim of absolute 
ownership creates a title by prescription, not merely for defen­
sive but for all practical purposes, upon which an action to 
quiet the title may be maintained.”
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In Tourtelotte v Pearce, 42 N. W., 915, it was held that “a party 
who has been in the actual, open, notorious, exclusive, adverse 
possession of real estate for ten years thereby acquires an abso­
lute title to such real estate and may maintain an action to have 
certain deeds, which are clouds upon the title, set aside and 
declared void and quiet his possession in the premises.
Judge Gantt in Horbacli v Miller, 4 Neb. 47, quoting from 
Graffiius v Tottenham, 1 W. & S., Pa. 488, stated the effect of 
the statute very clearly as follows: “ The title of the original 
owner is unaffected and untrammeled till the last moment, and 
it is vested in the adverse occupant by the completion of the 
statutory bar; the transfer has relation to nothing which pre­
ceded i t ; the moment of conception is the instant of birth. 
Therefore the operation of the statute takes away the title of 
the owner and transfers it, in legal effect, to the adverse 
occupier; and one who purchases the written title of the owner 
buys a title which by operation .of law was fairly vested in the 
adverse occupant.”
Regarding the recording of titles acquired by the operation 
of the statute of limitations we could find nothing that is more 
to the point than what is given in Schall et al v The Williams 
Valley Railway Company, 35 Pa. St., 191. Judge Graham, of 
the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, said in 
his charge to the jury: “ Title by the Statute of Limita­
tions is peculiar in some respects; although it is as perfect 
and absolute as a legal conveyance, it is not susceptible of 
being recorded as a deed. Its record is upon the ground and in 
the knowledge and recollection of those living in the vicinity.” 
Judge Woodward, of the Supreme Court, in ruling upon this 
case said: “ Titles matured under the Statute of Limitations are 
not within the recording acts. However expedient it might be 
to require some public record of such titles to be kept, and 
however inconvenient it may be to purchasers to ascertain 
what titles of that sort are outstanding, still we have not as yet 
any legislation on the subject, and it is not competent for 
judicial decision to force upon them consequences drawn from 
the recording acts. * * * Purchasers should not content
themselves with merely searching registries which were an 
invention consequent upon written titles, but they should make
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themselves familiar with the history of the possession for the 
last one and twenty years1 at least. And if they would be 
relieved of this necessity they must get the legislature to con­
trive a mode of putting this kind of title on the public records. 
Till that is done the courts will be obliged to give effect to 
such titles without regard to records.”
Regarding the ethical status of the law I will quote from 
Judge Hooker of the Supreme Court of Michigan: “Depriving 
one who has a clear paper title of his lands upon no better 
grounds than an unlawful occupancy, is too much like defeat­
ing an honest debt on the grounds that the creditor has been 
unduly lenient, to entitle the recipient of the benefits arising 
from such a transaction to very much commendation. The 
doctrine is well settled, however, and doubtless is productive 
of good, indeed it is indispensible from a public standpoint, 
whether it can be said to conduce to common honesty or not.” 
Judge Horton of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Leeds 
v. Bender, 6 W. & S., 318, in speaking of the statute of limita­
tions said: “The statute is a most important and beneficial one; 
it was made to protect those who had no other protection—for 
cases where all evidence is lost. It gives as perfect a title, if 
not a more perfect, than any other known to our law. I have 
attended to the operation of the statute almost half a century, 
and I do not know any more beneficial, and, in its general oper­
ation, more just law.”
In conclusion we wish to call attention to the ruling in the 
case of Ivy  v Young, 129 Mo. 501, viz: “Adverse possession is 
the act of holding possession against one having a superior 
right or title, under a claim of right to do so, and to constitute 
it there must first be an ouster of the real owner followed by 
actual possession by the adverse claimant, and second an inten­
tion on the part of the latter to oust the real owner and possess 
for himself.” Viewed in the light of the more specific and 
definite rulings hereinbefore quoted, it would seem that this 
is exclusive and inclusive enough, to be considered almost if 
not quite a perfect definition of the term ‘adverse possession.’
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